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ABSTRACT. –– This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of 
Vienna (1888-1938) in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria up to the 
establishment of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship 
between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society which has been 
emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle: the first aspect concerns the theory of a first 
Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. Hahn, P. Frank and O. Neurath; the second aspect is the 
contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is 
Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong; I will finally examine the link they established 
between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the 
founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the 
history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle. 
 
Deutsche! Wann werdet ihr von einer 
Verirrung, welche euch euren Nachbarn nur 
ungenießbar und lächerlich macht, endlich 
zurückehren?  
B. BOLZANO 
Und auch dieser Ruf des edlen Philosophen 
verdient, noch in unsere Zeit gehört zu werden! 
J. C. KREIBIG 
 
Many studies on the history of Austrian philosophy are dominated by the idea of a 
specifically Austrian philosophy (or Austro-Hungarian), whose origins date back to the 
Prague philosopher Bernard Bolzano, and whereby the focus is placed on Brentano’s 
philosophy and his student’s original contributions to this research program. This idea is 
at the heart of Otto Neurath’s book published in French in 1935 under the title Le 
développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique, in which he 
indicates that the philosophy promoted by the Vienna Circle is not only indebted to this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ A version of this text served as my presidential address at the 2011 Annual Congress of the 
Canadian Philosophical Association in Fredericton. Many aspects of my research on the Philosophical 
Society of the University of Vienna were the subject of conferences delivered at the Universities of 
Luxemburg, Rio de Janeiro, Grenoble and Ottawa. I wish to thank all of those who took part in the 
discussions, Kevin Mulligan for his comments on a previous version of this text, and Denis Courville who 
is responsible for the English translation. I wish to thank as well the Canadian Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council for the financial support provided for this research.  
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Austrian philosophical tradition, but can been seen as its culmination. The thesis of a 
specifically Austrian philosophy has recently been held by Rudolf Haller in a number of 
studies, most notably in an article entitled “Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy”, in 
which he formulates the so-called “Neurath-Haller Thesis”1. According to this thesis, 
there is since Bolzano an autonomous Austrian philosophy (particularly with respect to 
the German tradition) which possesses an “intrinsic homogeneity” that can be 
characterized among other things by its scientific world view and its aversion for 
Kantianism and metaphysics. 
In recent years, this thesis has given rise to a number of discussions which we will 
not examine here2. We shall focus our efforts on the issue of the empirical circumstances 
regarding the development of this Austrian Geist up to the foundation of the Vienna 
Circle in 1929. In other words, we will examine the institutional and cultural factors that 
have made possible, at a concrete level, the transmission of this tradition. K. Mulligan3 
and B. Smith4 have both recognized the importance of this question and the significance 
of socio-political, economic, and cultural factors, and more generally of institutions, in 
the explanation of this phenomenon. But which factors and institutions were specifically 
at play? Smith does not directly address this question, but refers to the Manifesto of the 
Vienna Circle in which Neurath, its main author, emphasizes the importance of the 
Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (of which Neurath was himself an 
active member from 1906 to the mid-1920’s)5. Founded in 1888, the Philosophical 
Society ceased its activities in 1938, the year that Husserl, one of its most faithful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. R. Haller (1981, p. 92) formulates this thesis as follows: “I wish […] to defend two theses: first, 
that in the last 100 years there has taken place an independent development of a specifically Austrian 
philosophy, opposed to the philosophical currents of the remainder of the German-speaking world; and 
secondly that this development can sustain a genetic model which permits us to affirm an intrinsic 
homogeneity of Austrian philosophy up to the Vienna Circle and its descendants.” 
2. On this question, see Mulligan’s recent article (2011).  
3. Mulligan (2001, p. 8) writes on this question: “But the institutional and cultural history of the 
effects of Bolzano, Brentano and his students remains to be written.” 
4. Smith (1996, p. 6) recommends a mixed explanation that appeals to institutional factors: “Hence 
there is a need, in regard to our specific problem of the rise of scientific philosophy in interwar Vienna, to 
provide a mixed explanation, one that makes room both for institutional and economic and sociopolitical 
factors of the kind so far considered and also for the serendipitous role of individuals. A forceful and 
coherent explanation along exactly these lines has been provided by Neurath himself, in the section labeled 
‘Prehistory’ of the Vienna circle manifesto.” 
5. Cf. O. Neurath, 1935, p. 38 and 1929, p. 302. 
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members died. Since its foundation, this organization served as a forum for philosophical 
discussions which brought together Vienna’s major philosophical, scientific and literary 
figures of the late nineteenth century. More than six hundred conferences were delivered 
within this society during the fifty years of its existence6 and its members were not only 
for the most part Austrian philosophers from that era, but also many scientists and 
intellectuals interested in philosophical issues. It is therefore surprising that such a 
respectable institution has never been the subject of a systematic study7. There are 
however a few studies that have emphasized the importance of this organization’s 
activities for its members, the most well-known and earliest being that of C. Schorske, 
Fin-de-Siècle Vienna. Politics and Culture, in which he examines the “Klimt Affair”, a 
question we will later return to more in detail8.  
But these studies provide us only with a limited perspective on the diversity and 
the richness of the discussions that took place between the Society’s members and 
explain even less the role of this organization in the evolution of ideas during this 
decisive period in the history of philosophy in Austria. For want of describing in detail 
the proponents and the accomplishments of this organization, we will predominantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. R. Meister (1938) has drawn up a list of the conferences and discussions that marked the history 
of the Philosophical Society during the 50 years of its existence.  
7. Cf. J. Blackmore (2001, p. 74) offers the following explanation: “We are only at the start of a 
serious research into the Vienna Philosophical Society and there are many more basic documents and 
publications which still must be found in order to really understand this remarkable organization and how it 
could have slipped out of scholarly attention so completely.” Thanks to the technological resources that are 
presently at our disposal, we now have access to most documents relating to the Philosophical Society. Cf. 
bibliography. 
8. In addition to a study written by Schorske (1980), let us mention the edition of a portion of Otto 
Weininger’s correspondence by H. Rodlauer (1990). Rodlauer has shown that the discussions within the 
Society have directly contributed to the philosophical and scientific education of the young Weininger and 
to the development of his classical work, Geschlecht und Charakter. We should also mention the studies 
written by J. Blackmore (1995, 2001a and 2001b) on Mach and Boltzmann, in which he insists on several 
occasions on the importance of the Society for this segment of the history of philosophy in Vienna. More 
recently, T. Uebel (2000) has insisted on the importance of the discussions in the Philosophical Society 
regarding the philosophical education of the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle, particularly that of 
Otto Neurath, to which we will return later. Breuer’s biographer, A. Hirschmüller (1978), has also 
discussed Breuer’s active participation in the Society’s activities and has published part of his 
correspondence with Brentano regarding the famous dispute on Darwinism, which Rodlauer also discusses. 
D. R. Coen (2007) has examined another debate within the Philosophical Society about Adolf Exner’s 
rectorial address which gave rise to Brentano’s well-known article “Über die Zukunft der Philosophie” and 
in which A. Höfler, W. Jerusalem and F. Jodl also took part. Recently, in a book entitled The Schenker 
Project, N. Cook (2007) has offered a commentary of Heinrich Schenker’s conference (February 15 and 
March 18, 1895) entitled “Der Geist der Musikalischen Technik”. 
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focus on the importance of the Philosophical Society in the genesis and prehistory of the 
Vienna Circle. We will examine three aspects that characterize the relationship between 
the members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society. The first aspect deals 
with the thesis of a proto-Vienna Circle; the second concerns the missing link thesis 
connecting the Vienna Circle with the philosophical tradition of Bolzano and Brentano in 
Austria; and lastly, the third corresponds to the connection established by many historians 
of logical empiricism between the Philosophical Society’s annexation to the Kant-
Gesellschaft in 1927 and the foundation of the Vienna Circle in 1929. 
 
1. The Characteristic Features of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna  
Let us start with a brief description of the Philosophical Society of the University 
of Vienna. Thanks to the testimony of some of the Society’s members and especially its 
annual reports9, we possess a great deal of valuable information concerning its origins, its 
structure, its activities and the characteristic features that distinguish it from other 
societies, for which most Viennese of that time expressed a predilection. We know first 
of all that the Philosophical Society was officially founded on March 26, 1888 by 
students of Franz Brentano. One of these students, who contributed to its creation, was 
the Polish philosopher Kazimir Twardowski who recounts in his autobiography the 
circumstances under which the Society was founded. Twardowski mentions, in addition 
to the informal seminars held by Brentano at the University Vienna, the creation of a 
discussion group comprised of some of Brentano’s students:  
But my philosophical study was not exhausted by attending lectures and seminars and by 
the solitary reading of philosophical writings, among which the works of the British 
philosophers were at the forefront. It also found valuable nourishment and maturation 
from a group reading (together with a number of similarly disposed philosophy students) 
of the major works of Aristotle. This philosophical reading club was formed on the 
initiative of Dr. Hans Schmidkunz, later well known in wide circles as the author of 
philosophical books and champion of higher-school pedagogy, to whom a lasting 
friendship binds me ever since those University years. Dr. Schmidkunz not only launched 
that reading club, in which we delved deeply – in the spirit of Brentano – into the reading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. The annual reports of the Philosophical Society were published from 1888 to 1918 under the 
title “Jahresbericht der philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien” (= Jahresbericht). 
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and interpretation of Aristotle's original text (with the aid of Thomas Aquinas 
commentary), but also managed to initiate regular meetings devoted to philosophical 
exchange between the veterans and the beginners from among Brentano's students, which 
not only brought the individual participants personally closer together, but also led to the 
inauguration in 1888, likewise due to the impetus of Dr. Schmidkunz, of the 
Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna. I was rather proud to be elected the 
first Vice-President of that Society. My close relations to Alois Höfler, J[osef] Clemens 
Kreibig and Christian von Ehrenfels to mention those names that are of philosophical 
interest, go back to that time10.  
 
K. Twardowski, H. Schmidkunz, J. C. Kreibig, C. von Ehrenfels and A. Höfler 
were indeed very active during the first thirty years of the Philosophical Society’s 
existence and most of them held key positions in the administration of this organization. 
Höfler was appointed as the first president of the Society and held this position at two 
different occasions, as we shall see later. The list of the Society’s members, updated in 
each of the annual reports, mentions the names of many other students of Brentano, most 
notably: A. Meinong and most of his students from Graz; Husserl, who was studying 
since 1886 under the supervision of Carl Stumpf in Halle; Franz Hillebrand, a student of 
Marty, E. Heiring and E. Mach in Prague; and many other lesser-known students such as 
Richard Wahle, Karl Neisser, Georg C. Fulda, Eduard Leisching and Alfred von Berger, 
just to name a few. Most of Brentano’s students held the majority of positions in the 
Austrian universities, while others held administrative functions, such as E. Leisching, 
the director of an art museum11, K. Neisser, who was a librarian, and the flamboyant 
Alfred von Berger who is known for having been director the Burgtheater of Vienna12. 
Like most of his students, Brentano was heavily involved in the activities of the Society 
and gave the inaugural address entitled “On the Method of Historical Research in the 
Discipline of Philosophy”13, a conference known for characterizing as pathological the 
system-building efforts of the German idealists. He will deliver again five other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Twardowski, 1999, p. 21; cf. Jahresberichte 1897-1898 and 1912-1913 on the circumstances 
surrounding the foundation of the Philosophical Society. 
11. Cf. E. Leisching, 1978. 
12. Cf. A. Bettelheim, 1915. 
13. Brentano, 1888. 
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conferences before leaving Austria for Switzerland in 1895; most notably one on the 
concept of truth14 and another one on the future of philosophy15.  
That being said, despite the involvement of Brentano and his students in this 
organization, the initial vocation of this society was not aimed at promoting the interests 
of a particular group, nor a specific cause, which was the case with other important 
associations at the time, such as the Volksbildungsverein, the Ethical Society or even the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. As a society of the University of Vienna, it depended 
directly upon the support of the Faculty of Philosophy and its professors. In this respect, 
we need to remember that Brentano’s academic situation as a privatdozent since 1880 
and his strained relationship with the state deprived him of any academic power. As such, 
Brentano’s assistance to his students’ initiative in founding the club came mostly in the 
form of moral support. The academic support came rather from Robert Zimmerman, who 
was since the resignation of Brentano the only full professor within the Department of 
Philosophy and who held the position of rector at the University of Vienna the year the 
Philosophical Society was founded. Many of the Society’s annual reports emphasize 
Zimmerman’s major contributions to the Society16: not only was he responsible for the 
Society’s institutional foundation, but he was also very active within the organization and 
presided over it for nearly a decade (from 1889 up to his death in 1898). Two annual 
reports inform us of the existence of tensions between, on the one hand, Zimmerman and, 
on the other, Brentano and his students. The origin of the conflict lied in Zimmerman’s 
bias towards Herbart’s philosophy and his desire to instill it in the Philosophical 
Society17. This in all likelihood would explain Höfler’s resignation as the president of the 
Society only three semesters after its foundation.  
Much like Brentano, Zimmerman had recognized very well the potential of this 
select club for the future of philosophy in Austria. In one of his many articles on the 
history of philosophy in Austria, “Philosophie und Philosophen in Österreich” published 
in 1889, Zimmerman already recognized in this young society “the organ” of a generation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. Brentano, 1889. 
15. Brentano, 1893. I examine (in Fisette, 2012, forthcoming) the issue of the involvement of 
Brentano and his students in the Philosophical Society.  
16. Jahresbericht, 1897-1898, p. 3; cf. Jahresbericht 1888, p. 5-6, Jahresbericht 1888-1889, p. 5. 
17. Jahresbericht, 1893-1894, p. 12 and Jahresbericht, 1912-1913, p. 6. 
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of researchers in philosophy and in the sciences, who under the influence of philosophers 
such as A. Comte and J.S. Mill, endorsed empiricist principles.18. As a student of Bolzano 
and a proponent of the philosophy of Herbart, Zimmerman’s claim is significant. It 
allows us indeed to identify a dominant orientation in the history of philosophy in 
Austria, stretching from Bolzano to the Vienna Circle, and including Herbartianism, 
which dominated the history of philosophy in Austria for a number of years, the School 
of Brentano and a few other members of the Philosophical Society such as T. Meynert 
and other students of Brentano mentioned by Zimmerman in this article. This empiricist 
orientation, by which Zimmerman characterizes the philosophical position common to all 
of the Philosophical Society’s founding members, is indeed the common denominator of 
the history of the Philosophical Society up to the Vienna Circle. This tendency expresses 
itself most notably with respect to its members’ predilection for British empiricism, as it 
is shown in many conferences and discussions on this topic. This has also been noticed 
by Neurath in the historical portion of his book, in which logical empiricism appears to 
be the culmination of these empiricist orientations expressed within the history of 
Austrian philosophy since Bolzano. As the first sentence of the book explains, Vienna 
centralizes “the conditions conducive to the development of an empiricist attitude such as 
the one radically professed by the Circle”19. In a speech delivered on the occasion of his 
70th birthday, Zimmerman states that this empiricist tendency was originally a reaction to 
the decline of speculative systems and particularly German idealism20. Brentano’s 
philosophy of history upheld by most of his students is also based on the same 
assessment. 
Zimmerman’s remark on the involvement of researchers from the natural sciences 
in the Philosophical Society introduces another important characteristic feature of this 
institution, namely its interdisciplinary vocation. This is ascertained by the membership 
list and the conferences delivered at the Society during the first years of its existence. We 
can observe that not only professional philosophers did not constitute the majority of the 
Society’s membership, but also that the founding members of the Society, who belonged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. Zimmermann, 1889, p. 269. 
19. Neurath, 1935, p. 8. 
20. Jahresbericht, 1893-1894, p. 4-13. 
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to other departments in the Faculty of Philosophy, were indeed very involved in the 
organization and the activities of the Society. Zimmerman mentions rightly so the 
contribution of T. Meynert21, a student of Rokitansky, who was himself a student of 
Bolzano. But we should also call attention to the involvement of many of Meynert’s 
colleagues from the Department of Medicine, such as J. Breuer, Brentano’s medical 
doctor and a collaborator of his student Freud, M. Benedikt, H. Obersteiner and M. 
Kassowitz. Zimmerman mentions as well Theodor Gomperz from the Department of 
Philology who, with his son Heinrich, is the cause behind Mach’s hiring at the University 
of Vienna22. But the list does not end there. Indeed, many other well-known scientists 
were also active in the Society, notably members of the Department of Physics, such as 
Franz Exner and his Circle23, L. Boltzmann, S. Meyer, M. Smoluchowski, F. Hasenöhrl 
and P. Frank; the representatives of the Viennese School of art history: F. Wickhoff, A. 
Riegl and M. Dvorak; the famous Austrian economists Carl Menger, Josef Schumpeter 
and Ludwig Bertalanffi; lastly, some of the professors of the Department of Mathematics, 
among them Hans Hahn, and the Department of Musicology, such as G. Adler. 
That being said, this society was not solely the organ of the Faculty of Philosophy 
and, contrary to other organizations, it was not reserved exclusively to its members. Since 
its creation, this society attributed to itself a democratic vocation, a principle often 
emphasized in many of its annual reports24 and which translated itself concretely into 
what was called at the time in England “University extension”25. This refers to a 
European movement that spread to Vienna in the 1880’s with the establishment of the 
Volksbildungsverein [Circle of Popular Education] in which many of the members of the 
Philosophical Society were involved, including Ludo Hartmann, E. Reich, T. Leisching, 
T. Meynert, A. Lampa, F. Jodl and W. Jerusalem. But whereas the vocation of the 
Volksbildungsverein lied in promoting scientific education to those who did not have 
access to it, the idea behind the expansion of the university was to extend and to 
democratize the activities of the teaching staff outside of the academic sphere and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Cf. Höfler, 1892. 
22. Cf. J. Mayerhofer, 1967. 
23. Cf. B. Kralik and E. Schmid, 1982, and D. R. Coen, 2007. 
24. Cf. Jahresbericht, 1896-1897, p. 2. 
25. Cf. M. Keilhacker, 1929. 
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make them accessible to the general public. Brentano’s seminars, which led to the 
foundation of the Philosophical Society, represent an example of this movement. This 
explains for example that the membership of the Philosophical Society does not 
accurately reflect the number of audience members who regularly participated in the 
Society’s meetings. The 1902-1903 Annual Report lists between 200 and 300 attendees, 
yet we know for a fact that a conference given by Jerusalem in 1904 attracted more than 
800 people26. 
Another distinctive feature of this society is the importance given to discussions 
during its meetings. The way in which discussions were conducted imposed itself not 
long after the Society’s creation and it replaced the initial formula whereby discussions 
were to be limited only to parallel meetings on texts and topics determined beforehand. 
The new formula simply consisted in introducing the discussion topic with a short 
presentation and in confronting the point of views: 
These [discussions] (conducted for the most part by Höfler and by Kreibig during 
Höfler’s four year absence in Vienna) are and were dedicated to the free exchange of 
ideas on all sorts of contentious philosophical problems that were usually of a more 
general nature; following the presentation of a very detailed issue by the commentators, 
and even if the discussions were spontaneously conducted without any particular 
preparation on the part of the other participants, they led nevertheless in most cases to 
the preferred option of reconciling the contradictory positions or at least to a 
clarification of the point of views required by all parties27. 
 
We know as well that these discussions continued most of the time at the 
“Kaiserhof” Café or the Mitzko Café near the University as indicated by many 
documents which even specify that most of the discussions simply did not go through the 
University28. 
The choice of discussion topics was determined by the commission and could be 
related to one of the Society’s conferences, a recent work or even an event of general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. Cf. W. Jerusalem, 1925, p. 32. 
27. Jahresbericht, 1913, p. 8-9. 
28. Every member of the Society received before each meeting an invitation (Einladung), on 
which appeared the agenda, the title of the conference as well as an invitation to the members and their 
guests to take part in the evening discussion meetings that were held regularly at the Café Mitzko.  
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interest. The most well-known case is the “Klimt Affair”. To make a long story short, the 
University of Vienna had ordered a painting from the painter Gustav Klimt intended for 
the new building housing the Faculty of Philosophy. Klimt produced a large mural 
entitled “Philosophy”, which did not please the members of the Faculty, so much so that 
the latter signed a petition to have it removed. The art historian Franz Wickhoff resented 
his colleagues’ haste in passing so rashly a categorical judgment in the absence of any 
competence in the matter. In fact, Wickhoff delivered a conference “Was ist häßlich?” 
[What is Ugly?] in front of a large audience in the course of which he defended Klimt29. 
An annual report referred to Wickhoff’s conference to show that the Society represented 
the forum where questions regarding current events were discussed philosophically at the 
time: 
Let us first take the example of F. Wickhoff’s conference “What is Ugly?” and the 
discussions that resulted from the following general meeting of the Society. During this 
period, since all of Vienna was held in suspense by a particular artistic question, our 
Society proved to be a place where each question, in spite of it being a current event, 
could be treated with serene objectivity on the basis of documents provided by art 
history and, it would seem, to the satisfaction of all those who took part in the 
conferences and the discussions30. 
 
A final characteristic feature of the Society should be mentioned, namely its 
involvement in the publication and the edition of philosophical works. Indeed, in addition 
to the annual reports published between 1888 and 1917 and in which we find the list of 
the conferences and the discussions, the membership list, the purchases of the library and 
its financial statements, the Society also published a selection of conferences and 
discussions in the proceedings which took on many names over the years 31. In 1914, the 
Philosophical Society established the Bolzano Commission, whose mandate was to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. Cf. H. Bahr, 1903 and A. Strobl, 1964. 
30. Jahresbericht, 1899-1900, p. 1. 
31. Between 1902 and 1911, the title of this publication was “Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum 
Jahresbericht der philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien”; it was changed in 1912 for 
“Jahrbuch der philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien”, a title which remained until 1916. 
After a ten-year interruption, it was published between 1926 and 1935 under the title “Wissenschaftliche 
Jahresberichte”. The Philosophical Society has also published works under the title “Veröffentlichungen 
der Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien”: J. Reynolds (1893), A. Höfler (1899), I. 
Kant (1900) and A. Höfler (1900).  
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prepare the edition of Bolzano’s complete works, including the manuscripts discovered in 
Zimmerman’s archives. But only Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite and the first two 
volumes of his Wissenschaftslehre were published by the Society32. We will later return 
to this topic.  
 
2. The Proto-Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society  
With this concise description of the Philosophical Society of the University of 
Vienna, we may now address the question of its significance in the history of philosophy 
in Austria and its key role in the prehistory of the Vienna Circle. Neurath emphasized on 
two occasions the Philosophical Society’s importance in the prehistory of the Vienna 
Circle: the first one in the Vienna Circle Manifesto in which he insists on the importance 
of the numerous discussions on the foundations of physics and other problems relating to 
the logic and theory of knowledge33; he refers to it a second time in his 1935 book where 
he specifies on this occasion that the discussions that took place in the Society triggered a 
long process whereby the Vienna Circle was established:  
In Vienna, the logical tendency of the Brentano School was professed by a man 
who, by launching discussions on the foundations of physics, triggered the 
beginnings of the Vienna Circle at the onset of the 20th century: Alois Höfler, 
Professor of Pedagogy at the University of Vienna. He was, for a long time, responsible 
for the publications of the “Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna”; these 
publications reveal a dedication in confronting the same problems to which the Vienna 
School would later dedicate itself34. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. Cf. B. Bolzano, 1914 and 1920.  
33. “Brentano and his students time and again showed their understanding of men like Bolzano 
(Wissenschaftslehre, 1837) and others who were working toward a rigorous new foundation of logic. In 
particular Alois Höfler (1853-1922) put this side of Brentano’s philosophy in the foreground before a 
forum in which, through Mach’s and Boltzmann’s influence, the adherents of the scientific world 
conception were strongly represented. In the Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna numerous 
discussions took place under Höfler’s direction, concerning questions of the foundation of physics and 
allied epistemological and logical problems. The Philosophical Society published Prefaces and 
Introductions to Classical Works on Mechanics (1899), as well as the individual papers of Bolzano (edited 
by Höfler and Hahn, 1914 and 1921). In Brentano’s Viennese circle there was the young Alexius von 
Meinong (1870-82, later professor in Graz), whose theory of objects (1907) has certainly some affinity to 
modern theories of concepts and whose pupil Ernst Mally (Graz) also worked in the field of logistics. The 
early writings of Hans Pichler (1909) also belong to these circles” (Manifesto, 1929, p. 303). 
34. Neurath, 1935, p. 38. 
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The reference to Höfler in this passage aims at establishing a certain continuity 
between the Vienna Circle and the philosophical program supported by Brentano and his 
students as well as to distinguish within the Society’s history the periods chaired by 
Höfler from those chaired by other members of the Society such as F. Jodl (1903-1912) 
and Reininger (1922-1938), to whom will return shortly. It is indeed during Höfler’s term 
as the Society’s president that the discussions referred to by Neurath were the most 
significant. 
  
2.1 Haller’s Thesis on the Proto-Circle and Frank’s Testimony  
While Neurath simply focused on the filiation between logical empiricism and 
empiricist tendencies within Austrian philosophy, other historians have put forward the 
idea that there was, among the members of the Philosophical Society, a group that 
constituted what R. Haller has called the first Vienna Circle:  
The thesis I present for examination is this. Even before the founding of the so-called 
Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick, there existed a first Vienna Circle with Hans Hahn, 
Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath. This circle is of such constitutive importance for the 
formation of the circle around Schlick that the judgment can be justified that it was really 
Hans Hahn who founded the Vienna Circle. To draw attention to this I call the one the 
first, the other the second Vienna Circle35.  
 
This thesis has been reiterated and developed systematically by other historians of 
Austrian philosophy, particularly F. Stadler and especially T. Uebel36. This thesis is based 
on a remark made by Philipp Frank in the introduction to his book Modern Science and 
its Philosophy, where he alludes to the existence of a discussion group that met in Vienna 
in the 1900’s and whose most active members were himself, Hahn and Neurath: 
At the time when the first chapter of this book was written (1907) I had just graduated 
from the University of Vienna as a doctor of philosophy in physics. But the domain of 
my most intensive interest was the philosophy of science. I used to associate with a 
group of students who assembled every Thursday night in one of the old Viennese 
coffee houses. We stayed until midnight and even later, discussing problems of science 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. Haller, 1991, p. 95. 
36. Cf. T. Uebel, 2000, p. 76 sq. 
13 	  
and philosophy. Our interest was spread widely over many fields, but we returned again 
and again to our central problem: How can we avoid the traditional ambiguity and 
obscurity of philosophy? How can we bring about the closest possible rapprochement 
between philosophy and science? By “science” we did not mean “natural science” only, 
but we included always social studies and the humanities. The most active and regular 
members of our group were, besides myself, the mathematician Hans Hahn, and the 
economist, Otto Neurath37.  
 
Frank informs us also that Hahn, Neurath and himself did not only take interest in 
the Grenzfragen regarding their respective fields, but that they also strived in these 
discussions “to absorb as much information, methodology and background from other 
fields as we were able to get38”. There is reason to believe that the discussions that fueled 
these famous meetings were not unrelated to the Philosophical Society’s activities, to 
which Franck as a physicist, Neurath as an economist and Hahn as a mathematician owed 
much of their philosophical instruction. This is initially confirmed at the beginning of 
Franck’s first conference in 1907 at the Philosophical Society entitled “Mechanismus 
oder Vitalismus?”: “The Philosophical Society was always the place where the 
representatives of different scientific fields met to discuss the boundary questions of their 
respective disciplines39.” 
Another passage in the introduction to his 1949 book indicates that Hahn, Neurath 
and Franck were not the only members of this group, but also that their discussions 
addressed topics that were for the most part remote from their academic concerns: 
This apparent internal discrepancy provided us, however, with a certain breadth of 
approach by which we were able to have helpful discussions with followers of various 
philosophical opinions. Among the participants in our discussions were, for instance, 
several advocates of Catholic philosophy. Some of them were Thomists, some were 
rather adherents of a romantic mysticism. Discussions about the Old and New 
Testaments, the Jewish Talmud, St. Augustine, and the medieval schoolmen were 
frequent in our group. Otto Neurath even enrolled for one year in the Divinity School of 
the University in order to get an adequate picture of Catholic philosophy, and won an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37. Frank, 1949, p. 1. 
38. Frank, 1949, p. 1. 
39. Frank, 1908, p. 393. 
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award for the best paper on moral theology. This shows the high degree of our interest 
in the cultural background of philosophic theories and our belief in the necessity of an 
open mind which would enable us to discuss our problems with people of divergent 
opinions40. 
 
For the moment, we will abstain from identifying the other members of the group 
in question, but it is very likely that they are for the most part members who regularly 
participated in the activities of the group during the period referred to by Frank41. 
There are other reasons to think that the discussions within this group were fueled 
by the activities of the Philosophical Society. First, we should remember that Hahn like 
Victor Kraft, who arguably belonged to this group, became members of the Society as 
soon as 1901, followed by Frank (1903), Neurath (1906), Olga Hahn (1908) and Edgard 
Zilsel (1913). They delivered many conferences within the Society and all took part 
actively in the discussions42. Hahn, Franck and Kraft were all involved in the 
administration of the Society: in 1899, Kraft contributed to the edition, prepared by the 
Philosophical Society, of Kant’s work Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Naturwissenschaft; Hahn contributed to the edition of The Paradoxes of the Infinite, 
while Franck was in 1911 the Society’s secretary43. It should be mentioned finally that 
P. Frank and H. Hahn remained members of the Philosophical Society even after having 
left Vienna. It is therefore very likely that these Thursday meetings to which Frank refers 
in his introduction coincided most of the time with the Society’s activities and focused on 
the organization’s conferences and discussions. Thus, the arguments raised in support of 
an initial Vienna Circle seem on the contrary to indicate that the activities of the group in 
question were inseparable from the activities of the Society and that, if we rely on the 
testimony offered by Frank, this pseudo Vienna Circle was in fact simply a group 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Frank, 1949, p. 1-2. 
41. Many of the Society members that were active at the time correspond to Frank’s description: 
Hans Pichler, also mentioned by Neurath (1935, p. 37), Wolfgang Schultz, who contributed to the edition 
of Bolzano’s works and possibly Hans Von Arnim, T. Gomperz’s replacement, Oskar Ewald, Emil Lucka 
and Robert Eisler. It should be noted that Hahn was also interested in parapsychological phenomena (cf. 
Karl Menger, 1988).  
42. Cf. T. Uebel, 2000, p. 140-142. 
43. One of the Society’s annual reports (Jahresbericht 1911-1912, p. 2) mentions Frank’s 
significant contribution to the Society as well as his involvement as a speaker and a member responsible for 
discussions pertaining to philosophical problems in physics. 
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comprised of a few members of the Philosophical Society who mainly discussed various 
questions that stemmed from the organization’s activities. 
 
3. The Missing Link and the Reception of Bolzano in Austria  
Let us now come back to the more general question of the Philosophical Society’s 
role in the history of philosophy in Austria up to the foundation of the Vienna Circle in 
1929. By relying on the diagnostic made by Neurath in his 1935 book, Uebel (1999, p. 
259) argued that the missing link connecting the Austrian tradition, represented by 
Bolzano and Brentano, with the Vienna Circle was no one other than Höfler himself. This 
argument was systematically developed in his voluminous work on Neurath, in which he 
formulates his argument as follows:  
In the work and person of Höfler met the Austrian philosophical tradition and modern 
philosophical Vienna. This is suggested by a closer examination of both aspects of 
Höfler’s influence, which had a special meaning for the first Vienna Circle44.  
 
This thesis has also been supported more or less explicitly by J. Blackmore in his 
book on Boltzmann, in which he emphasizes Höfler’s role in this history so much so that 
he speaks of Höfler’s Society45. At first glance, this thesis may seem plausible notably 
because of the key positions held by Höfler in the Society since its foundation. Indeed, he 
led the discussions for more than twenty years, he was president on three occasions 
(1888, 1898-1903, and 1913-1922) and he received the title of honorary president 
[Ehrenpräsident] when he left for Prague in 1903. Moreover, this student of Boltzmann 
and Stefan already possessed a solid education in the fields of physics and mathematics, 
and his diverse philosophical interests made him an indispensable intermediate in the 
discussions between scientists and non-scientists. And as a student of Brentano and 
especially of Meinong, he maintained privileged ties with many of the Society’s 
members, particularly Kreibig, Schmidkunz, von Ehrenfels and K. Twardowski who, as 
we have shown, were all very involved in its administration and its activities.  
That being said, other indications contradict Uebel’s thesis and question the 
disproportionate importance given to Höfler in the Philosophical Society and, more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. T. Uebel, 2000, p. 104. 
45. Cf. J. Blackmore and al., 2001b. 
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generally, in the transmission of Brentano’s and Bolzano’s ideas. Ample information 
contained in his autobiography seems to indicate for example that, despite his academic 
interest for the Grenzfragen of philosophy and the natural sciences, Höfler was far from 
sharing the scientific world view of the positivists as well as their aversion for 
Kantianism and metaphysics. Regarding the question of his relationship to Kantianism, a 
passage in his autobiography clearly indicates that he did not share Brentano’s 
philosophy of history and his assessment of the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer:  
Thus when I heard Brentano speak with contempt about Kant and Schopenhauer and 
jest about Wagner, it was not so much my understanding but my spirit that guarded me 
from his so-called world view entirely different from divine and human affairs46. 
 
How can this full pledged member of the Kant-Gesellschaft, who always 
defended a Wagnerian world view as indicated in his later writings, most notably on 
Schopenhauer47, represent the Austrian philosophical tradition and act as the missing link 
between Bolzano and the Vienna Circle? Moreover, considering that Boltzmann and 
especially Mach held a special significance for the members of the Vienna Circle, we 
must remember that Höfler, in one his biographical texts on Brentano, criticized the 
Faculty’s decision to hire Mach, who never defined himself as a philosopher, and 
“Boltzmann, the neophyte in philosophy” who was in reality rejecting it48.  
The supporters of the missing link thesis would undoubtedly respond to these 
objections by arguing that Höfler’s philosophical allegiance has never stopped him from 
playing a key role in the transmission of Brentano’s ideas and particularly those of 
Bolzano to the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle. Against Uebel49 and Blackmore, 
we would like to show very briefly, with respect to the example of Bolzano’s reception in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46. A. Höfler, 1921, p. 120-1. 
47. Cf. A. Höfler, 1920, p. 89. 
48. A. Höfler, 1917, p. 325. 
49. Uebel (1999) supports the missing link thesis by referring to a few arguments, notably Höfler’s 
role in transmission of Bolzano’s ideas to the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle. The first, on which 
we will focus here, insists on the importance of the textbooks written by Höfler for the teaching of 
philosophy in Austrian lyceums, notably the Logik of 1890 (written in collaboration with Meinong) which 
was the source of a lively controversy with Brentano (cf. Höfler, 1921). Uebel argues that it is by means of 
this textbook that Hahn and Neurath, for example, became acquainted with Bolzano (T. Uebel, 1999, p. 
261; cf. also Uebel, 2000, p. 109 sq.) It seems to us that this argument exaggerates the importance of this 
textbook with respect to education and particularly its Bolzanian content. We will grant more importance to 
another one of Uebel’s arguments which asserts Höfler’s role in the reception of Bolzano within the 
Philosophical Society and Austria. 
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Austria, that Höfler’s role in this history is marginal in comparison to the one played by 
many other members of the Philosophical Society and that the problem with the missing 
link thesis is that we must not let the trees hide the forest. In other words, the connection 
between the Austrian philosophical tradition and the Vienna Circle is made possible not 
by an individual, but by an institution. 
 
3.1 The Reception of Bolzano in Austria 
On March 9 1914, the Philosophical Society sets up the Bolzano Commission, 
whose primary mandate, according to its statutes and rules, is mainly to ensure the 
reprinting of Bolzano’s works and to publish the manuscripts discovered a few years 
before50. A few months earlier, during the first session of the Philosophical Society in 
1913, Höfler presents with great pomp this commission’s project in front of many of his 
faculty colleagues and members of the Society51, and recounts the stages that marked the 
history of this project. He quotes at the outset the 1902-1903 Annual Report that accounts 
for the discovery of Bolzano’s manuscripts, including his function theory, that were for a 
long time in Zimmerman’s possession:  
After many unsuccessful attempts […], a very important collection of Bolzano’s original 
manuscripts which consisted of philosophical writings and mostly mathematical writings 
were discovered in the Imperial Court Library. The Society’s secretary, Robert von 
Sterneck, examined these muddled manuscripts and we can now value the importance of 
this discovery. What has been discovered is nothing less than a manuscript on the “theory 
of functions” which was ready to be printed and is astonishingly close to the modern 
ideas52. 
  
Following this discovery made by von Sterneck, Höfler made a few attempts to 
obtain the necessary funding to publish Bolzano’s works, but these attempts failed 
particularly due to the fact that Höfler left Vienna and accepted in 1903 a position in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50. The statutes and the rules of the Bolzano Commission are recorded in a document approved on 
March 9, 1914 entitled “Soderstatut der Bolzano-Kommission der philosophischen Gesellschaft an der 
Universität zu Wien”.   
51. Cf. Jahresbericht, 1912-1913, p. 10. 
52. Jahresbericht, 1912-1913, p. 6-7. 
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Prague53. The discovery of Bolzano’s manuscripts is indeed an important chapter in the 
history of Bolzano’s reception in Austria, but it is not the first, nor the most important. 
This is shown in another annual report (1902-1903, p. 6) in which Benno Kerry’s 
contributions are highlighted with respect to a series of articles that he published between 
1885 and 1891 under the title “Über Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung” and 
in which he discusses notably the Bolzanian doctrine of the propositions in themselves54. 
The writings of Kerry exerted a crucial influence not only on Höfler55, but also on K. 
Twardowski, which the latter confirms in his autobiography:  
My work Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine 
psychologische Untersuchungen grew out of these considerations. I endeavored to write 
it in the spirit of Franz Brentano –and of Bernard Bolzano, whose Wissenschaftslehre I 
studied with great zeal ever since I was steered to it by Kerry’s paper Über Anschuung 
und ihre psychische Verarbeitung56. 
 
In 1894, Husserl writes an essay, known today as “Intentional Objects”, in which 
he discusses Twardowski’s work and his interpretation of Bolzano. Two years later, in 
his 1896 course on logic, Husserl understands (pure) logic in the sense of Bolzano’s 
Wissenschaftslehre. In 1900, he publishes his Prolegomena to Pure Logic in which he 
claims the rediscovery of Bolzano and uses the latter’s Sätze an sich as an antidote to 
logical psychologism. The follow-up to the story is well-known, and we now know the 
importance of the debates surrounding psychologism that the publication of Husserl’s 
work generated within and mostly outside of the Society57.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53. Marty’s correspondence with Brentano gives us reason to believe however that there were 
other factors that delayed this project, and notably Marty’s own opposition to it, as he was sitting on the 
Commission charged with evaluating the Society’s grant application for the funding of this project. In a 
letter dated February 19, 1905 and addressed to Brentano, Marty reminds the latter that there must be no 
question to provide Höfler with such an amount and adds that little wickedness which he attributes to a 
colleague, that Höfler’s main interest in this story was to appear on the cover page of Bolzano’s complete 
works, Cf. Gimpl, 1998. 
54. Cf. B. Kerry, 1885-1891. 
55. Cf. A. Höfler, 1894. 
56. Twardowski, 1999, p. 24. 
57. On the reception of Bolzano in Austria, a lesser known publication should be mentioned: a 
special issue of the journal Deutsche Arbeit (1908) that commemorates the 60th anniversary of Bolzano’s 
death (1781-1848) with articles written by two of Brentano’s students, H. Bergmann (1908) and E. Utitz 
(1908); the following year Bergmann publishes his book Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos 
(1909). 
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This story’s subsequent episode is the institutionalization of the Bolzano project 
in the Philosophical Society in 1914, that is, following Jodl’s resignation as president and 
the return to power of Höfler and his allies. When presenting this commission in front of 
the members of the Society, Höfler clearly indicates that the commission’s vocation was 
not only to publish Bolzano’s complete works, but also to promote the ideas of this “great 
Austrian philosopher”:  
If I allowed myself to mention the creation of a Bolzano Commission within the 
Philosophical Society, it is first and foremost to avoid that this interest for this great 
Austrian philosopher subsides and to ensure that it fructifies durably […]. It suffices for 
the moment to emphasize that the Philosophical Society of the Vienna University, by 
what it accomplishes for Bolzano’s works, now wishes to pay homage to him on behalf 
of a philosophical society58.    
 
The creation of this commission coincides with the new edition of the first volume 
of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre prepared by W. Schulz59. And it is not a coincidence if, 
in 1914, Twardowski delivers two conferences at the Society’s Hauptversammlung which 
served as the basis for one of his most significant philosophical texts, that is, “Functions 
and Formations” (Funktionen und Gebilde) in which he understands the formations (or 
intentional contents), following Stumpf and Husserl, on the basis of Bolzano’s model of 
the propositions in themselves60. The interest prompted by these two conferences can be 
measured among other things by the fact that they led to a few discussion meetings at the 
Society. It is neither a coincidence if another member of the Bolzano Commission, Josef 
C. Kreibig, published the same year an article on Bolzano in which he emphasizes the 
importance of the latter in the history of philosophy in Austria61. Kreibig suggests, as 
clearly indicated by the two passages placed as epigraphs to his article, that Bolzano was 
then what Kant represented and still represents for philosophy in Germany. He states the 
following on this subject: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58. Jahresbericht, 1912-1913, p. 14.  
59. Bolzano, 1914. H. Hahn’s edition of The Paradoxes of the Infinite will follow in 1920. 
60. We have offered a French edition of this Twardowski text (Fisette and Fréchette, 2007, p. 343-
385) and have translated “Funktionen und Gebilde” by “Fonctions et formations” (“Functions and 
Formations”) following the indications given by Twardowski himself, who borrows these terms from Carl 
Stumpf. 
61. J. C. Kreibig, 1914. 
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We have therefore good reasons to believe that the history of philosophy of the past 
century would have no significant event to report if it were not for Bernard Bolzano, a 
thinker whose universality, depth and sagacity deserve more admiration at the scientific 
level than so many glaring poetic thoughts glorified by his contemporaries62.  
 
In summary, the Uebel-Blackmore thesis on Höfler’s role as the missing link is 
questionable not only because of Höfler’s philosophical positions, but also for the reason 
that his role in this history is relatively marginal compared to some of the other members 
of the Society. Here again, it is an institution, in this case the Bolzano Commission, that 
serves as the connection with the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle, and particularly 
with Hans Hahn who was a member of this commission. We should bear in mind 
however that the question of the reception of Bolzano in Austria, and particularly the 
different actions carried out by the members of the Philosophical Society with the aim of 
promoting the work and the ideas of Bolzano, can only make sense in the light of the 
symbolic value that the author of the Wissenschaftslehre holds in the history of Austrian 
philosophy. In the following section, we will attempt to show that this is the significance 
that he had for some of the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle.  
 
4. The Creation of the Vienna Circle and the Annexation of the Society to the Kant-
Gesellschaft  
A third important aspect regarding the relationship between the Philosophical 
Society and the members of the Vienna Circle pertains to the relationship established by 
Stadler (1997, p. 248), Uebel (1999, p. 260; 2000, p. 142) and Blackmore (2001b, p. 257-
258) between the Society’s annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the creation 
of the Ernst Mach Verein, and then of the Vienna Circle in 1929. The connection 
between these two events has been established on the basis of an anti-Kantian attitude 
that is often attributed to the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle, and their 
willingness to create an association founded on a philosophical program that reflects the 
spirit of the Austrian tradition in philosophy. We believe indeed that there is a strong 
connection between these two events, but we do not believe that the Philosophical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62. Kreibig, 1914, p. 274. 
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Society’s annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft represents by itself a sufficient motive to 
explain both the withdrawal of the Vienna Circle’s Austrian members from the 
Philosophical Society and their willingness to create a distinct group. Other issues must 
be taken in consideration in order to explain this decision, particularly political and 
ideological issues which are intimately related to the Austrian tradition in philosophy.  
 
4.1 Reininger and the Philosophical Society  
One of the important pieces of this puzzle is the philosopher Robert Reininger, 
who presided over the Philosophical Society after Höfler’s death in 1922 until its 
disbandment in 1938. This appointment occurred in the context of major transformations 
in the Viennese philosophical landscape which can be compared to those that marked 
Brentano’s departure from Vienna and Mach’s appointment the same year, as well as 
appointment of the anticlerical F. Jodl and his antidote, the theologian, L. Müllner in 
1896. After the death of Adolf Stöhr in 1921, the Philosophy Department was left with no 
full professor. The following year, the Faculty of Philosophy proceeded to hire three new 
full professors, including Reininger, who already held a position in Vienna, and two 
German philosophers who were already established, Moritz Schlick and Karl Bühler. The 
contribution made by Schlick to the philosophy of logical empiricism is well-known, but 
that of Bühler to the psychology and the philosophy of language is less, and it is 
important to know that after the death of Brentano, Meinong, Kreibig and Höfler, Bühler 
is the one who best represented the Brentanian tradition in Vienna63. As for Reininger, he 
is one of the rare students of Zimmermann and as such, he is the exception that proves the 
rule, as he is one of the rare proponents of Kantianism, as shown by most of his 
publications that promote the Kantian view of the world64.  
 
4.2 The Annexation of the Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft  
First, we must remember that Reininger became a member of the Philosophical 
Society at the turn of the twentieth century and that he quickly rose in the ranks of this 
organization’s hierarchy: under the presidency of Jodl, with whom he maintained strong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63. Cf. K. Mulligan, 1997. 
64. Cf. K. Nawratil, 1969. 
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ties, he held from 1904 the position of secretary and, from 1906-1912, the position of the 
Society’s vice-president. Thus, his nomination as president of the Philosophical Society 
in 1922 went without saying as it ensured continuity in the history of the organization. 
But were we aware that this epigone of Kant would carry out many actions that were 
detrimental to the Society, of which he himself had not measured all the consequences? 
For, under the presidency of Reininger, the Society underwent many major 
transformations that altered most of the characteristic features that we attributed to it at 
the beginning of this study. Indeed, the list of conferences and discussions held at the 
society between 1922 and 1938 indicates that Reininger, in practice, abolished the 
discussion meetings, which, as we saw, represented the cornerstone of this society. The 
number of conferences given by non-philosophers was considerably reduced, which 
implied the renouncement of the interdisciplinary vocation of the Society, or at least its 
democratic nature. Reininger also abandoned projects that were cherished by his 
predecessors, mainly that of the Bolzano Commission65. Actually, the sum of these 
measures and other actions carried out by Reininger and his students led to a situation 
whereby this society could no longer be differentiated from many of the other groups 
affiliated to the Kant-Gesellschaft. The logical step regarding this degenerating phase in 
the Society’s history was its annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft. This was carried out in 
1927 as confirmed by a report published the same year in the Kant-Studien:   
On November 18, 1927 was held, under the presidency of Professor Robert Reininger in 
Vienna, the general meeting of the “Philosophical Society” during which the 
“Philosophical Society”, to the request of the commission, was acknowledged as a local 
group of the Kantian Society. From now on, it will bear the title of “Philosophical 
Society of the University of Vienna”, local group of the Kantian Society in Vienna66. 
 
The same report however also indicates that the administrative board of the 
Society, which issued this decision, was comprised among others of K. Bühler, M. 
Schlick and R. Meister, who held Höfler’s pedagogy chair since the latter’s death. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65. We can state as proof the publication of the four volumes of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre in 
1929 by W. Schultz, a former member of the Bolzano Commission; an edition that does not mention the 
Society by name. Cf. B. Bolzano, 1929. 
66. “Bericht”, Kant-Studien, 1927, Bd. 32, p. 556. 
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means that even if this initiative most likely came from Reininger, he was supported by 
many members and especially by his three colleagues, Schlick, Bühler and Meister, with 
whom moreover he maintained ties of friendship67. Furthermore, we know that Bühler 
like Schlick published on a few occasions in the Kant-Studien68 and that Schlick, like 
many other members of the Vienna Circle, regularly delivered conferences at the Kant-
Gesellschaft as well as at the Philosophical Society, even following its annexation. 
Therefore, whether they were involved in the decision that led to the Society’s annexation 
to the Kant-Gesellschaft, Bühler and mostly Schlick had in principle no reason to oppose 
it. 
The same cannot be said of the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle, who had 
witnessed the golden age of this society in which they were involved for more than 
twenty years. There is good reason to believe that they did not welcome with indifference 
the news of the Society’s annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft. Evidence of this is 
suggested by the fact that Neurath, Hahn, Frank and Zilsel did not deliver one single 
conference at the Philosophical Society after 1927. Is this all a matter of coincidence? 
According to the historians of the Vienna Circle mentioned earlier, not only is it not a 
coincidence, but the Society’s annexation would be at the source of Neurath’s efforts to 
establish a discussion group that would be distinct from the Philosophical Society. In his 
autobiography, Karl Menger reports that Schlick had received with some reservations 
Neurath’s project of founding the Ernst Mach Circle by recalling the existence of the 
Philosophical Society:  
As the academic year [1928-1929] went on and Carnap got more radical, Neurath got 
more excited and aggressive. When the idea of spreading the new insights uppermost in 
his mind, Neurath suggested that a society (ein Verein) for the promotion and propagation 
of a scientific view of the world be founded and named after Mach. ‘We have the 
Philosophical Society’, Schlick protested […]. But Neurath easily convinced Hahn and 
Carnap that this was not enough. […] The Verein would start its activities with some 
public lectures in 1928-1929. Schlick was not altogether happy. But Neurath was on the 
warpath69. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67. Cf. K. Nawratil, 1969. 
68. Cf. M. Schlick, 2008, and K. Bühler, 1926, 1933.  
69. K. Menger, 2009, p. 81. 
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This testimony offered by Menger sheds light particularly on the issue of the 
disagreement regarding the question as to whether the Philosophical Society still 
represented a suitable venue for the future members of the Vienna Circle to freely discuss 
the philosophical issues that were of interest to them at the time. Neurath was convinced 
that this was not the case, and our thesis is that his reasons were not foreign to his 
connection to this specifically Austrian philosophical tradition that he puts forth in his 
1935 opuscule. This is what we would now like to examine.  
 
4.3 Reininger’s Motives: His Kantian View of the World 
What explains the withdrawal of the members of the Vienna Circle from the 
Society’s activities and Neurath’s willingness to create a distinct entity is maybe less the 
Philosophical Society’s annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft than the motivations behind 
this turnaround. Indeed, in another report on the Philosophical Society this time published 
in the Kant-Studien, Reininger explains his motives a little more clearly. The first 
concerns precisely the very idea of an Austrian philosophy, of which he disputes the 
existence in the name of a particular pan-Germanic philosophy:  
When we had decided, two years ago, to become a local group of the Kantian Society, 
this decision was born out of the high esteem that we held for the greatest philosophical 
association in Germany and the aspiration to formally join the great community of all 
German friends of philosophy. This community has actually always existed: there is not 
and has never been a specifically Austrian philosophy for which I should account, but 
only a German philosophy in which we, Austrians, participate70.  
 
This is a rather surprising assertion coming from a philosophy historian and a 
privileged witness to the development of philosophy in Austria. This can be seen as a 
form of denial on the part of the president of the Philosophical Society, but there is much 
more to this decision. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage in which Reininger 
informs us that the Anschluß (the annexation) of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-
Gesellschaft was achieved in the name of an ideal that he attributes to all his compatriots:  	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In this respect, the annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft also held special symbolic 
significance for us. Of course, philosophy is not a national matter, but concerns 
humanity as a whole. But for us, Austrians, this close alliance with the greatest 
association of German philosophers represents more than a simple community of 
practical work. It is primarily a testimony to our inseparable spiritual and cultural 
belonging to the German people and therefore not only a simple question of 
convenience, but more importantly still, it represents a little step on the path of the 
realization of an ideal that is alive in all Austrians71 
 
Reininger does not yet state what this ideal is, but simply asserts that the Society’s 
subordination to an organization that promotes the “great German philosophers” is an 
expression of a cultural and spiritual belonging to the German people as a whole. But in 
other writings, notably in his conference in honor of the 200th anniversary of the birth of 
Kant and in another text published that same year under the title “Kant and the German 
Culture”72, Reininger indicates unequivocally that this ideal is nothing other than the 
Kantian world view that he attributes to the Großdeutschland, and that the realization of 
this ideal, of which the Society’s Anschluß to the Kant-Gesellschaft constitutes the first 
step, must necessary be carried out by means of Austria’s Anschluß to Germany. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that Austria’s annexation to Germany in 1938 was, for this 
proponent of the Großdeutschland, the realization of a dream long cherished73.  
 
4.4 Es gibt eine spezifisch österreichische Philosophie 
Although Reininger’s remarks are purely ideological and that as such, they serve 
no historiographical value, we can nevertheless draw a few valuable conclusions from 
them. First, by establishing an opposition between, on the one hand, the Kantian world 
view and the Kant-Gesellschaft and, on the other, the Philosophical Society and a 
specifically Austrian philosophy, Reininger undoubtedly supposes that, for many 
philosophers that belong to his generation, the Philosophical Society was to philosophy in 
Austria what the Kant-Gesellschaft represented for the Kantian tradition in Germany. 
Secondly, the proposition: “es gab und gibt keine spezifisch österreichische Philosophie” 	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72. Cf. R. Reininger, 1924.  
73. Cf. K. Nawratil, 1969, p. 69-70. 
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does not only follow from positing the existence of a pan-German Kantian philosophy, 
but also aims to discredit the dominant philosophical tendencies in Austria since Bolzano, 
as well as the many initiatives carried out to promote these ideas within this respectful 
institution. The Bolzano Commission is exemplary in this respect. Neurath’s initiatives as 
well as his remarks on the prehistory of the Vienna Circle are specific reactions and 
responses to these actions carried out in the name of Kantian world view. This is also the 
case for most of the historical writings of the Society’s members following its annexation 
to the Kant-Gesellschaft. For want of demonstrating this, we will restrict ourselves to a 
number of general remarks that go in this direction. 
In the preface of his book Between Physics and Philosophy, P. Frank also opposes 
the Austrian philosophical tradition to the Kantian world view of German philosophy, 
which seems to echo the ideology conveyed by Reininger and his acolytes:  
The European movement had its origin in the ideas of the Austrian physicist Ernst 
Mach. At the beginning of the twentieth century it had a large following in the scientific 
circles of Austria, especially in Vienna and Prague. In spite of the common German 
language, this movement could find only a few adherents in the universities of the 
German Reich, because there the philosophy of Kant and his metaphysical successors 
reigned, being regarded as a world picture particularly suited to the German nation74.  
 
In all of the historical writings of the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle, 
including those of V. Kraft, we find this twofold concern which consists of distinguishing 
oneself from this Kantian world view and asserting a connection to the Austrian 
philosophical tradition. And as Neurath recalls (1935, p. 38), the Kantianism advocated 
by Reininger is a late option that appears in the history of philosophy in Austria. 
Neurath’s remarks are confirmed by two long-standing members of the Philosophical 
Society, who serve as privileged witnesses to the evolution of philosophy in Austria after 
the death of Zimmerman, that is, Heinrich Gomperz and Carl Siegel, who both wrote a 
short history of philosophy in Austria. Siegel, a student of Jodl who latterly converted to 
idealism, and of whom we will not therefore accuse of “Kant-bashing”, does not hesitate 
to speak of a specifically Austrian philosophy whose characteristic feature since Bolzano 	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is objectivism75. Gomperz is less categorical than Siegel or Neurath, but he does ask the 
right question in an article in which he recounts the history of philosophy in Austria 
during the years of the Philosophical Society’s existence:  
It is not easy to say whether any common and specifically “Austrian” features may be 
detected in all these approaches. What is clear, however, is that a perpetual exchange of 
ideas as well as of persons has been going on between Austria and the rest of Germany 
and that, if Austria has been richly fertilized by the great currents of German intellectual 
life, it has amply repaid its debt by itself contributing to these currents in a measure that 
ought never to be overlooked76.  
 
The general diagnostic offered here by Gomperz reflects the one found in most of 
the historical writings from Zimmerman up to Neurath, that is, the empirical orientation 
that is specific to this tradition. This is as well the diagnostic offered by Victor Kraft in 
his account of the history of the Vienna Circle:  
Thus there has existed a long tradition of empiricist philosophy in Vienna, concerned 
primarily with the natural sciences. But even before that time empiricist tendencies had in 
a sense asserted themselves through Franz Brentano77.  
 
According to this perspective, logical empiricism can be understood as the natural 
development of this Austrian philosophical tradition, which it also radicalizes as Neurath 
explains in his 1935 book.  
 
5. Final Remarks  
One of the objectives of this study was to examine the role of our institutions in 
the transmission of a tradition during a given period. We have insisted more particularly 
on the importance of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna in 
transmitting and preserving this typically Austrian tradition in philosophy, and we have 
shown that it is partly responsible for creating the Vienna Circle. It is important however 
to distinguish the institutional aspects of this society and the issues that were at the heart 
of the Philosophical Society, as it served as a philosophical discussion forum in which 	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76. H. Gomperz, 1936, p. 311.  
77. V. Kraft, 1953, p. 3; cf. also V. Kraft, 1952.  
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were addressed various questions that were of interest to the Austrians and the Viennese 
at the time. We have barely scratched the surface of the rich content contained in some of 
the 600 conferences and discussion meetings that marked the history of the Society 
during the fifty years of its existence. In this respect, some of the writings mentioned in 
the beginning of this study give an idea of the scientific value and historical importance 
which this philosophical forum represented. In addition, as a forum that brought together 
the great Viennese intellectual figures, the Philosophical Society provides us with a 
specific framework, with its structure and its rules, as well as well as a philosophical 
perspective that differs from those adopted in the many writings on fin de siècle Vienna, 
which focus on topics such as the failure of liberalism, decadence, identity crisis or yet 
therapeutic nihilism, as exemplified by W. M. Johnston’s classical book The Austrian 
Mind78. This perspective also allows us to avoid the pitfalls of a backward history of 
philosophy as advocated by certain historians of the Vienna Circle, who tend to see in the 
Austrian philosophical tradition nothing other than a Vienna Circle in the making or, to 
borrow Husserl’s well-known expression, its secret aspiration. 
With respect to the ideological dimension of this institution, our scope was limited 
to Reininger’s efforts to subordinate the Philosophical Society to an organization, which 
at time, promoted the “great German philosophers”. We showed that the reactions elicited 
by this decision demonstrate that the Philosophical Society was not considered as an 
organization simply amongst others by Austrians. As we have indicated at the beginning 
of this study, if we take into account the circumstances that led to the foundation of this 
organization and the significant involvement of Brentano and his students in the 
administration and activities of the Philosophical Society, it appears that this organization 
did not strictly represent for them a neutral discussion forum. The conferences delivered 
by Brentano in Vienna before his departure for Switzerland contain valuable information 
about the projects that he conducted for the Society, but also philosophy in general in 
Austria79. But destiny decided otherwise and, as we have also indicated, it was Robert 	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79. But we also need to know that after his departure, in 1895, Brentano’s name no longer appears 
in the Society’s annual reports and, contrarily to most members of the Society, his death in 1917 was not 
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Zimmerman who, due to his academic situation among other things, took matters into his 
own hands. A number of sources indicate that there were tangible tensions between 
Zimmerman and Brentano, particularly in an annual report published on the occasion of 
the 25th anniversary of the Society, which reveals that the source of these conflicts lied in 
the monopoly of Herbart’s philosophy in Austria since Count Leo Thun’s reform and of 
which Zimmerman was the main representative since his arrival in Vienna:  
Since the reform of high schools and higher education institutions in 1850, Herbartianism 
was the official philosophy in Austria as was Hegelianism in Prussia at the time. 
Nevertheless, in the decade during which our society was founded, such a monopoly 
became increasingly anachronistic. Directly in line with this transition phase, there were 
so to speak two poles, Zimmerman, on the one hand, Franz Brentano and his many 
students, on the other80.  
 
This polarization revealed itself in many forms within the Philosophical Society, 
most notably in 1889 during a conference given by Zimmerman on Herbart’s psychology, 
which Brentano criticizes at length in his correspondence with Zimmerman81. 
But the sworn enemy of Brentano and his students in Vienna was the Bavarian 
philosopher Friedrich Jodl, who was president of the Philosophical Society between 1903 
and 1912. Jodl is mainly known for his work in ethics, his edition of the works of 
Feuerbach as well as the founder of the Ethical Society82. He also made himself known 
during his presidency at the Philosophical Society for his involvement in the Klimt 
Affair, which was examined earlier, his well-known polemic with Boltzmann83 and his 	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83. This polemic occurred in 1905 during a conference delivered by Boltzmann on Schopenhauer 
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wanted to commit suicide then he should do it, but that he could never prove it was rational. As is well-
known, Boltzmann himself committed suicide the next year, that is, in September 1906.” We know through 
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maneuvers against Brentano and his students. His situation is incidentally tied to 
Brentano’s students: he obtains a position in Prague in 1884 as C. Stumpf’s replacement 
and becomes the colleague of A. Marty and T. Masaryk, two other students of Brentano; 
afterwards he receives an appointment as Zimmerman’s replacement in 1896 in Vienna, 
and he himself is replaced in Prague by another of Brentano’s student, that is, C. von 
Ehrenfels. As pointed out by Höfler in his autobiography, at the time of his departure 
from Prague in 1896, Jodl made it his mission to eradicate what he called the 
“Brentanoids” from the Austrian planet and thus intensified his efforts to break the 
monopoly held by the students of Brentano in the Austrian universities. In his 
correspondence with Bolin and in a long letter addressed to Breuer, the anticlerical Jodl 
describes Brentano’s students as a provincial clique made up of priests or former priests 
who promote a liberal theology84. Jodl increased his efforts within and outside the 
Philosophical Society to break what he also called the “Brentano system”. Finally, we 
should note that Jodl could rely on other opponents of Brentano within the Society, 
particularly L. Müllner, A. Stöhr and mostly W. Jerusalem who intensified the attacks on 
Brentano85.  
Our examination of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna was 
limited to a few aspects of the relationship that we can establish between this 
organization and the Vienna Circle. Our ambition was simply to call attention to the 
significance of this institution within the history of philosophy in Austria, as 
Zimmermann, Brentano, Jodl, Reininger and Neurath all recognized in their own way. 
Many other aspects of this remarkable organization deserve an in-depth examination not 
only with respect to the Austrian philosophical tradition, but also regarding the many 
scientific disciplines that underwent astonishing developments during the 50 years of the 
Society’s existence. For, as an organ of the Faculty of Philosophy and because of its 
interdisciplinary nature, the Philosophical Society was a privileged witness to the 
discussions that marked the evolution of disciplines such as psychiatry and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his correspondence with Brentano, with whom he was close during this period, that it was Brentano that 
convinced him to modify this title and to bring important changes to his text. 
84. Cf. Gimpl, 1990, p. 46-47. 
85. This is confirmed by W. Jerusalem (1925, p. 1-35) in a few passages of his autobiography, 
which were removed from the official version published by R. Schmidt in 1922. 
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psychoanalysis (the numerous debates about sexuality, for example), zoology (the dispute 
over Darwinism represented one of the most important debates within the Society), 
physiology and physiological psychology (with Mach, Hering, a number of colleagues 
from the Department of Medicine, Brentano and most of his students), physics (debates 
on classical mechanics and the theory of relativity with Höfler and most of the members 
of the Department of Physics), economics, sociology, ethics, history of art, musicology, 
etc. This is why the Philosophical Society represents an important resource with respect 
to the study of what is commonly referred to as fin de siècle Vienna. 
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